



ΠΕΡΙΟΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΤΜΗΜΑΤΟΣ
ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ
ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟΥ ΑΙΓΑΙΟΥ

THE BIRTH OF MAN AND THE ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE

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Abstract

This paper examines Michel Foucault's notion of the "analytic of finitude" through his engagement with Kant and, secondarily, Heidegger, focusing on the anthropological question "What is Man?". It retraces the points of contact between the anthropological problematic that emerges in Kant's late works and Foucault's archaeological project, in order to highlight the Kantian threshold at whose limit Foucault attempts to craft a history of the present. It argues that the analytic of finitude functions as a guiding problematic that traverses Foucault's archaeological and genealogical analyses, linking the constitution of Man as an empirical-transcendental doublet to later inquiries into power and subjectivity. The persistence of the Kantian reference becomes even more evident in "What Is Enlightenment?", where Foucault discerns in Kantian critique the possibility of the Nietzschean position of the genealogist. Finally, the paper links Nietzsche's epistemological proclamation of the "death of God" with Foucault's declaration of the "end of Man", as respectively indicative of a passage beyond, and an overcoming of, the Kantian threshold.

Keywords: continental philosophy, epistemology, analytic of finitude, Kantian anthropology, human sciences, Michel Foucault, Martin Heidegger

In his *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, Michel Foucault had already set out to outline what he would later call the "anthropological sleep" (Foucault, 2005: 371), marking a shift in the foundations of our way of knowing and naming the moment when knowledge made an anthropological turn beyond the classical system of representation and delved into the unending quest to know Man at the limits of the sovereignty of his consciousness. Foucault argues that, late into the 18th century, at the threshold of modernity, Kantian philosophy on the one hand and the newly emerging scientific fields of Biology, Philology, and Political Economy on the other converge on a single metaphysical and empirical problematic, namely the question of how a stable, concrete, and positive knowledge of Man is to be constructed. The question that crystallizes this convergence is the anthropological question (What is Man?), which Kant most explicitly formulated in his late works, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (Kant, 1996) and *Logic* (Kant, 1988).

Through these late texts, it becomes possible to embark on a reading of Kant's philosophical project as a rearticulation of this anthropological problematic that seems to silently inhabit his three *Critiques* and function as the framework within which his philosophical reflection develops. The questions "What can I know?" (*Critique of Pure Reason*), "What ought I to do?" (*Critique of Practical Reason*), and "What may I hope for?" (*Critique of Judgement*) may be read as individual moments and singular analytical attempts to address a fundamentally empirical problem at the center of which stands the figure of Man, as the empirical/transcendental subject of modern scientific discourse.

Martin Heidegger, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, emphasizes the tension between Kant's transcendental project in the *Critiques* and his turn to anthropological empiricism in the late works. For Heidegger, the late addition of the question "what is Man?" actually reveals the true substance of Kant's philosophical questioning. Kant's transcendental philosophy, he argues, necessarily drifts into a philosophical anthropology that strives to ground metaphysics in an analytic of the "subjectivity of the subject" (Heidegger, 1962: 221). Consequently, Kant's three fundamental questions around which he organizes the *Critiques* ultimately become reiterations of an analytic of human subjectivity that can be classified under the general term of anthropology, which his fourth question formally introduces (Heidegger, 1962: 214-215). The attempt to ground metaphysics in the transcendental subject therefore entails a reformulation of the question of Man which can only re-emerge, this time not as a transcendental, but as an empirical conception. Kant's philosophical reflection, though distinct from the empirical sciences that attempt to found anthropological knowledge through a definition of man's biological, psychological or social characteristics, is reduced, Heidegger claims, to the task Kant assumes in his *Anthropology*; namely the construction of a concrete knowledge of man purely in his empirical mode of being. In this sense, Heidegger interprets Kant's *Anthropology* as the outcome of a failure to secure the transcendental analytic on the ground of the subject's faculties so that the transcendental treatment of man collapses into an empirical anthropology (McQuillan, 2016: 189).

Foucault opens an implicit dialogue with Heidegger when, in his *Introduction*, he reflects on whether a concrete and stable conception of Man is already at work within the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Foucault, 2008: 19). More precisely, while he draws on Heidegger's interpretation of Kant,

he challenges Heidegger's conclusion that the anthropological question emerges only as the result of Kant's later "empirical turn". Foucault, as McQuillan notes, also seeks to explain how the anthropological question "relates" to the three questions of the *Critiques*. He argues, however, that it is already implicated in the *Critiques* themselves and is each time answered in a different way. (McQuillan, 2016: 190). The question "What is Man?" is not a late reduction stemming from an impasse that grounds the earlier questions. Rather, it names a structuring thread that traverses Kant's thought and reappears whenever the subject must be grasped both as condition and as object.

Accordingly, each *Critique* and its structural question configure a distinct conception of man. There is man as a transcendental subject in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which corresponds to the question "what can I know?". In Kant's moral philosophy, the subject appears as a 'person' which corresponds to the question "what ought I to do?". Finally, man appears as a subject of a philosophy of religion which corresponds to the question "what may I hope for?" (McQuillan, 2016: 190). The anthropological problem repeats these three questions and the division of faculties they presuppose, and thus cannot be articulated independently of them (Foucault, 2008: 86). The attempt to found a transcendental philosophical conception of the subject therefore already folds back into an empirical, anthropological and positive conception of man; an analytic of man's mode of being that produces the subject as an object of knowledge. Here arises the fundamental tension that will later be formalized as the analytic of finitude, since an analytic of the limits of man's faculties cannot but confront man as an empirical object of examination (Foucault, 2008: 106). Thus anthropology becomes at once "the science of man, as well as being the science and the horizon of all human sciences," and "the science of that which founds and limits man's knowledge for him" (Foucault, 2008: 117).

It is this tension, internal to the very attempt to ground positive knowledge in the subject, which serves, late into the 18th century, as the decisive condition that produces the transition from Analysis of Wealth to Political Economy, from Natural History to Biology and from General Grammar to Philology. Man thus appears as a recent discovery within a modern order of knowledge, a double being that is finite both empirically, as an object of knowledge, and transcendently, as the subject whose faculties serve as limits to its ability to know. The paradox of this relation at the heart of the sciences of Man becomes apparent here. As an empirical object, the subject precedes the transcendental framework, as it is subject to history, and yet, without this transcendental framework, the very idea of an empirical object makes no sense, as it is only through the transcendental faculties of the subject that any knowledge becomes possible. It is precisely this circular movement, a "vicious circle" as Béatrice Han notes, that Foucault calls the "analytic of finitude" in *The Order of Things* (Han, 2005: 186-187, 201; Foucault, 2005: 343).

The analytic of finitude is epistemically grounded in a triad of objects, namely language, life and labor, which function as what Foucault calls *quasi-transcendentals*. These are historically situated conditions that simultaneously enable and limit what can emerge as truth about Man (Han, 2005: 183). Conceived as a living, speaking, and working being, Man becomes within the post-Kantian knowledge arrangement the very condition of possibility for the appearance of any object of knowledge regarding Man. From the *quasi-transcendental* standpoint, finitude therefore

functions not as an obstacle to knowledge, but as its necessary condition. It is simultaneously restrictive insofar as valid knowledge must conform to it, and permissive insofar as, once it does, knowledge can acquire validity and certainty, it can function as truth (Han, 2003: 135). From the empirical standpoint, however, finitude does not appear as a universal and necessary condition, but as a set of contingent, historically shifting determinations, since language, labor and life acquire, within modernity, their own proper history and intrinsic laws of historical differentiation (Han, 2003: 137). Once history enters these objects, any claim to universal and necessary truth about man is structurally undermined. The epistemological figure of Man is thus constituted through the analysis of the historical forces that delimit him, whether these are *organic*, according to the discourse of Biology, *economic-desiring*, according to the discourse of Political Economy, or *linguistic-signifying*, according to the discourse of Philology.

Georges Canguilhem aptly describes this shift when he notes that life, labor and language become “natures themselves”, each with “its own specific history”, at the intersection of which man “discovers himself natured” (Canguilhem, 2005: 89). From the 18th century onward, life, labor, and language and their ‘natural’ laws, function as the conditions under which man, as subject, becomes at once available as a positive object of knowledge. Modern scientific discourse will *dissect* man as a being that lives, works and speaks according to the intrinsic characteristics of life as an *organization of functions*, of economy as a *process of production*, and of language as a summation of *grammatical rules*. Anthropological knowledge thus generates a third dimension at the core of the figure of Man through this mirror relationship between man and its double, granting the body depth and volume beyond the classificatory table of the Classical period or the observation and discovery of analogies and resemblances of the Renaissance.

In *The Order of Things* Foucault distinguishes between three *épistémès* (Renaissance, Classical, and Modern), each defined by the historically specific relations between statements, visibilities, and objects that organize what can function as knowledge. By the term *épistémè*, Foucault refers to the “total set of relations” that, in a given period, unites discursive practices and makes certain epistemological figures and sciences possible (Foucault, 2002: 211). An *épistémè* is therefore not the sovereign unity of a subject or a spirit, but the relational grid within which sciences, objects, and statements acquire their positivity and their rules of formation. It is this kind of history of knowledge that Foucault attempts to recount through his archaeological method. Archaeology does not offer a history of ideas in the traditional sense. It asks what it is for a science to exist as a science, how a science is formed and how it persists as such through historically specific practices. It therefore seeks the conditions under which a certain type of knowledge becomes possible, ideas are born, philosophies and rationalities articulated only, perhaps, to “dissolve and vanish soon afterwards” (Foucault, 2005: xxi-xxii). All in all, archaeology investigates what, in the positivity of discursive practices, makes possible the existence of epistemological figures and sciences (Foucault, 2005: 211-212). It is an inquiry into how ideas acquire legitimacy by forming a field of discourse and a set of practices that function as a regime of truth.

A further connection to Kant can be discerned at this point. In his response to George Steiner’s criticism of the *Order of Things*, Foucault notes that his use of the term archaeology is

indebted to Kant, who employed it to designate “the history of that which renders necessary a certain form of thought” (Foucault, 1971: 60). For Kant, “archaeology” names a “philosophical history of philosophy”, or else a philosophical archaeology, that aims to define the universality and necessity of the historical principles on which philosophical thought has been constructed, rather than to recount an empirical history of its sequence (Kant, 2002: 417). Such a philosophical archaeology is not based on historical narrative and facts of reason, but must explain the principles of their development. It is derived not from experience but from *a priori* principles, from the very nature of human reason, since its task is to account for the universality and necessity of the history of thought itself.

Foucault’s use of the term of course differs significantly. Rather than grounding history in the necessity of reason, he reconstructs the historical conditions under which orders of knowledge take shape, highlighting the contingency, multiplicity and heterogeneity that traverse discourses and practices which interact to produce historical differentiation. Therefore, where Kant sees necessity produced by the nature of human reason, Foucault sees contingency, ongoing battle and the Nietzschean roll of the dice which cannot but confirm the necessity of the contingent and the differential return of the Same.¹ Hence if Kant describes the *transcendental a priori* principles of knowledge, Foucault reconstructs the *historical a priori* of knowledge (McQuillan, 2016a).

Foucault contrasts the *historical a priori* with the *universal a priori* that the philosophical tradition -from Kant’s transcendental idealism to Husserlian phenomenology- set as the privileged site of reflection to delineate the relation between the subject and the possibility of knowledge. The *historical a priori* refers not to the “condition of validity for judgements” but to the “condition of reality for statements”, that is, to the conditions of emergence, coexistence, transformation, and disappearance of statements (Foucault, 2002: 143). It is not a formal Kantian or Husserlian *a priori* subsequently endowed with a history and a certain temporality. What Foucault describes is an *a priori* that is itself historical and does not elude historicity, insofar as “it is defined as the group of rules that characterize a discursive practice” in a certain period and it may be transformed with them in certain thresholds (Foucault, 2002: 144).

Where Husserl invokes the notion of the *a priori* to articulate an invariant structure of meaning and a world that is “historically changing in its particular styles but invariant in its invariant structure of generality” (Husserl, 1970: 347) and where Kant posits universal and necessary principles, describing the unmoving *a priori* of knowledge, in order to found the

¹ «Truly it is a blessing and no blasphemy when I teach: “Over all things stands the sky accident, the sky innocence, the sky chance, the sky mischief.” “By chance” – that is the oldest nobility in the world, I gave it back to all things, I redeemed them from their servitude under purpose [...] Oh sky above me, you pure, you exalted one! This your purity is to me now, that there is no eternal spider and spider web of reason: – that you are my dance floor for divine accident, that you are my gods’ table for divine dice throws and dice players! »

«If ever a breath came to me of creative breath and of that heavenly necessity that forces even accidents to dance astral rounds: If ever I laughed with the laugh of creative lightning that follows rumbling but obediently the long thunder of the deed: If ever I rolled dice with gods at the gods’ table of the earth, so that the earth quaked and ruptured and snorted up rivers of fire – – because the earth is a gods’ table, and it trembles with creative new words and gods’ throws. »

See Nietzsche (2006, 132, 185).

transcendental subject, Foucault instead traces a history without a subject. Such a history “enables us to understand how the formal a priori may have in history points of contact, places of insertion, irruption, or emergence, domains or occasions of operation” (Foucault, 2002: 144). This point becomes clear when one considers how the conditions of knowledge shift across *épistémès*. In the Renaissance, to know consisted in uncovering the intricate ways in which an object was bound to other entities in the world through analogy, resemblance, sympathy, and antipathy. In the classical age, by contrast, knowledge consisted in analysis and ordering, in rationally recomposing elements and situating objects within the ordered space of the classificatory table by marking their differences.² Accordingly, the *historical a priori* of the Renaissance *épistémè* can be characterized by resemblance and similitude, displaced in the Classical *épistémè* by representation and difference, and displaced again in the Modern *épistémè* by the figure of Man as an empirical-transcendental doublet.

Gilles Deleuze, in his reconstruction of Foucault’s oeuvre, suggests that knowledge is the “unity of stratum”, a layering of heterogeneous thresholds (discursive, non-discursive, perceptual, imaginative, institutional) that together constitute the field of an *épistémè*. Knowledge is composed of practices or positivities, that is, concrete operations, rules, statements and visibilities, rather than universal essences or transcendental categories (Deleuze, 1988: 51). An *épistémè* is therefore not a unified doctrine but a field structured by conditions of discursivity, shifts in visibility, and thresholds of emergence at which new forms of knowledge appear or existing ones are transformed. Moments in history where discursive and non-discursive practices reorganize themselves. These thresholds define the historical differences between strata. Archaeology, on this account, seeks to reconstruct these strata and the differences between them, bringing to the surface the points where practices reconfigure and the relations between what can be said and what can be seen are rearranged. What distinguishes one stratum from another is not a single foundational principle but a multiplicity of practices distributed across different levels (scientific, imaginative, perceptual, social). Foucault’s project thus mirrors the work of an archaeologist, digging through the piled-up strata of knowledge and mapping the layers and fractures that constitute different *épistémès*.

The transition to the modern *épistémè* involved the emergence of Man as a finite subject/object, whose finitude can be positively grasped and analyzed, and this reorientation reorganized the points of contact between statements, visibilities, and objects. It is this *historical a priori* that Foucault seeks to delineate, namely the rules under which certain knowledges become possible, their objects take shape, and their discourses acquire their specific form. On this basis, Foucault can argue that the transformation of medical discourse between the 18th and the 19th centuries is not primarily a matter of correct or incorrect findings, or of the truth of particular propositions, but of a more fundamental shift in the articulation of its objects. A medical text of the early 18th century is not simply wrong or outdated with respect to a 19th century text; it is rendered non-pertinent, irrelevant to the later discourse, because the very conditions under which knowledge is produced and its objects are illuminated have been transformed (Foucault,

² See Foucault (2005, chapters 2 & 3).

1980: 112). In other words, a new relationship is established between the field of statements and the field of visibilities.

When Foucault uses the term 'visibility', he is not returning to a phenomenological analytic of experience and perception. Visibilities are not things as sensible objects, visual elements or qualities. Visibilities designate the historical conditions of possibility under which objects can unfold to the gaze in a certain way and enter into relation with a field of statements. As Deleuze notes, "visibilities are not forms of objects [...] but forms of luminosity which are created by the light itself and allow a thing or object to exist only as a flash, sparkle or shimmer" (Deleuze, 1988: 52). This is why Foucault subtitles *The Birth of the Clinic* "*une archéologie du regard médical*", an archaeology of the medical gaze (Foucault, 1973). Each historical medical formation, Deleuze notes, "modulated a first light" and constituted a space of visibility for illness, making symptoms gleam in distinct ways, either by unfolding things in two dimensions as in the clinic, or by refolding them through a third dimension that restores depth to the eye and volume to pain, as in pathological anatomy (Deleuze, 1988: 58). Visibility therefore denotes the rules that govern how objects are made to appear to the gaze, the historically contingent field of luminosity that 'modulates a first light' and transforms appearances together with the practices and statements that accompany them. In this case, pathological anatomy radically restructured the perception of illness by tracing a third dimension within the body, allowing the gaze to meet the spatio-temporal roots of disease in the alterations of the tissues. The body, now the object of a positive gaze, reappears *in-depth*.

By following the thread of statements and visibilities that Foucault wove in his archaeological studies, one can grasp how the anthropological fold that opened a void in the heart of truth, and thus at the heart of Man, already prefigures the terrain on which his later analyses will operate. The analytic of finitude constituted life and death as epistemic objects, as objects of a positive gaze, and therefore as reflections of Man. Modern scientific medicine and Biology shaped an ontology of the subject as a finite living being, whose body, whether individual or collective (the population), becomes simultaneously the object of a scientific gaze and a site of intervention. In this sense, power comes to operate within the *depth* that this modern arrangement of knowledge instituted at the center of the figure of Man, whether in the biopolitical government of the milieu (security, statistics, hygienism, inoculation, city planning) or in the disciplinary production of useful, docile bodies (panopticism, enclosure, utilitarian organization of space/time). As Foucault retrospectively acknowledges: "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, in *Madness and Civilization* or *The Birth of the Clinic*, but power? Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field of analyses at my disposal" (Foucault, 1980: 115).

The analytic of finitude can therefore be treated as a through-line that runs throughout Foucault's work, from his early archaeological investigations to his later genealogical analyses of power and subjectivity, giving the human sciences their positivity and forming the terrain on which modern forms of government take hold. Read this way, the question "What is Man?" serves as a guiding problematic of both rationalities and technologies of power, as well as

discourses of truth. “The Kantian critique”, writes Foucault in *The Order of Things*, “marks the threshold of our modernity” (Foucault, 2005: 263).

It is by following the same circular motion that Foucault returns to Kant late in his work, in order to speak from a *limit-position* on the limits of the modern knowledge-power arrangement. In his 1984 essay “What is Enlightenment?” he retrieves Kant to foreground a form of philosophical ethos that he discerns in the Enlightenment, a *limit-attitude* consisting in “a critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing, through a historical ontology of ourselves” (Foucault, 1984: 45). Kantian critique makes this stance possible. It organizes its coordinates and provides the conditions of possibility for a practice of critique that proceeds from the frontiers of our historicized present. As Foucault insists, such critique must be “genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method” (Foucault, 1984: 46). One must occupy, in this sense, the Nietzschean position, the limit-position of the genealogist. Thus when Foucault returns to Kant, thereby indicating the persistence of a Kantian problematic in the background of his work, he does so to demonstrate that critique does not merely delineate limits, but can become a practice directed at limits themselves. The Kantian delimitation of reason thus opens the space for its overcoming in the form of a limit-critique, a limit-attitude that interrogates the historically constituted boundaries within which we think and act. Critique can then function as a form of resistance, as a mode of revaluation of our historical becoming. It is in Kant, therefore, that Foucault retraces the possibility of a Nietzschean genealogical critique. The Kantian threshold both grounds Foucault’s archaeology and, through its internal tension, prepares the conditions for its Nietzschean displacement.

It is at precisely this Kantian threshold that Friedrich Nietzsche’s infamous diagnosis of the “death of God” becomes decisive, for it names the historical void into which the figure of Man emerges. From this moment on, Man is situated at the heart of knowledge, both as a positive object and as the field of possibility within which knowledge itself must interrogate its limits. Yet the very delineation of this field already prescribes both its object (Man) and the modes of discourse through which knowledge may be produced. In this way, anthropology reconfigured the epistemological foundations once grounded in God, casting over modern thought “the shadow of a classical philosophy henceforth deprived of God” (Foucault, 2008: 117), marking “the absence of God”, and occupying “the void that the infinite leaves in its wake” (Foucault, 2008: 120). The decisive question it raises is whether it is possible to have empirical knowledge of finitude (Foucault, 2008: 118), whether, in other words, it is possible to develop a knowledge of man’s limits sufficiently free and self-grounded to grasp finitude itself as *a form of positivity*.

This form of thought, which since the late 18th century traversed Philosophy and the modern Human Sciences is ultimately the *limit* of Kant’s critical philosophy of *limits*. A philosophy that *wandered* on the paths of a reflection on the limits of knowledge, of faith and of practical reason to finally encounter man’s experience and the *mis-leading* aporia “what is Man?” that *leads* man’s quest for knowledge; that still *wanders*, a ghostly presence, above the figure of Man; that is responsible for this “homogenous, de-structured and infinitely reversible field in which man presents his truth as the soul of the truth” (Foucault, 2008: 123-124). The position that man assigned to himself in order to function as the soul of truth is the very same fragile position

that, as it turned out, had previously been occupied by God. "For man", writes Foucault, "in his finitude, is not distinguishable from the infinite of which he is both the negation and the harbinger; it is in the death of man that the death of God is realized" (Foucault, 2008: 124). When in the final pages of *The Order of Things* Foucault states that Man "is an invention of a recent date" and "the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge" he is essentially claiming that this arrangement may disappear, just as the Classical order vanished at the end of the 18th century, and the figure of Man, the bearer of both finitude and infinitude, may be erased "like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea" (Foucault, 2005: 422) taking along with it the last echo of the divine it replaced.

When Nietzsche heralded the death of God, he proclaimed the establishment of a modern scientific universe, in which the void that God's displacement had produced, would now be covered by the figure of Man, the one who killed him (Nietzsche, 1974, section 125: 181). Nietzsche gave prominence to this radical shift which repositioned man from an observer of the representations of the world, partial signs of a grand ontological plan under God and his creation, to the position of defender and creator of a system of knowledge whose center would be Man - a double transcendental being, simultaneously an object and a subject of knowledge- beyond the analogies, resemblances and differences between things that were reduced to and expressed a divine will. Man's finitude, contrasted to the infinity of God and his world, thus became both the foundation and the limit of this knowledge of man and of this anthropological project to bring to light all those workings of his body that remained, at least for the evaluations of the scientific discourse, in the shadow; to reveal the play between the depth and surface of its mental constructions, its bodily alterations, its habitual tendencies, its perceived deviations and pathologies.

The chronicle of this foretold death is essentially the history of the foundation of a modern scientific regime of truth and the reduction of man as a finite being, as being-toward-death, as a biological and living body at the center of a game of gazes, statements, exclusions and subjugations, of a play of lights and shadows, at the center of our knowledge system, in the place once held by God and his divine infinity. It is this *human, all too human* knowledge that gave birth to a modern scientific ontology which produces the subject as a living, speaking and working being. Man will therefore function as the *trace* of the presence of God or as the *sign* of its absence; as a *lack* within the order of truth, compelled to fold back upon itself to constitute the positivity of knowledge, which in turn will operate as the truth of Man. Thus, just as the epistemic orders of the Renaissance and Classical ages passed away, the modern order centered on Man is proven to be equally contingent. Nietzsche's death of God and Foucault's death of Man are two sides of the same critical gesture; a genealogy of finitude that reveals both the historicity and the fragility of the figure placed at the heart of modern thought.

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The analytic of finitude reveals modernity's structural paradox and exposes the fragility of the modern human sciences, grounded as they are in the figure of Man as both the condition of knowledge and its fragile object, at once the ground and the limit of truth. Foucault shows that this figure, born at the intersection of language, life, and labor, is neither timeless nor secure, but

a contingent invention of a particular epistemic order. A figure destined to vanish. Nietzsche's proclamation of the "death of God" anticipated this fragility. In displacing the divine, modernity elevated man to the center of truth, only to expose him to erasure. If Nietzsche's proclamation of the "death of God" marked the collapse of the divine foundation of truth, Foucault's "death of man" names the erosion of the anthropological figure that replaced it. Through the analytic of finitude modernity appears as an unstable threshold, in which Man, like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea, may be erased by the very tide of historical conditions that brought it into being, if it has not already disappeared.

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